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NOTE
THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIVE RECOGNITION
ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES RECOGNITION
PRACTICES UTILIZING THE CHINESE QUESTION
AS A GUIDE
INTRODUCTION
On December 15, 1978, President Carter stunned the nation by
announcing the United States intention to extend long denied formal
recognition1 to the People's Republic of China.' With the extension
of recognition President Carter shattered a thirty year old wall of
formal diplomatic silence between the United States and the PRC.
The United States previous protracted policy of non-recognition of
the PRC derived from a traditionally subjective interpretation of in-
ternational legal principles.' In an effort to utilize recognition to im-
pede the extension of communist dominion,' the United States had
inconsistently applied fundamental principles of international law.
Specifically, only superficial consistency exists between
American and international delineation of the prerequisites for
recognition. Simply stated, in order to warrant recognition, both the
1. "Recognition" refers to either the formal act or the continuing relationship
established by the act of recognition between the recognizing state and the entity or
regime recognized. The logistics of recognition usually entail receipt of a formal com-
munication from the new state or government requesting recognition. Recognition may
then be accorded by either an issuance of a written or oral proclamation or by implica-
tion. See generally H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND NOTES
99-193 (2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as BRIGGS]; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 89-108 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as BROWNLIE]; 1 G. HACK-
WORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-387 (1944) [hereinafter cited as HACK-
WORTH]; H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947) [hereinafter cited
as LAUTERPACHT]; 1 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67-248 (1906) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE]; M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 266-90 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as SORENSEN]; 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-753
(1963) [hereinafter cited as WHITEMAN]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 94-114 (1965).
2. Hereinafter referred to as PRC. See N.Y. Times, December 16, 1978, at 1,
cols. 4 and 5, and at 8 col. 5.
3. See notes 42-67 infra and accompanying text.
4. See note 136 infra and accompanying text.
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United States' and traditional international law' require that an en-
tity must have an effective government in control of a defined ter-
ritory and population as well as an ability and willingness to carry
out its international obligations.' Under the declaratory8 interpreta-
tion of these prerequisites, the decision to extend recognition is ob-
jectively evaluated. If the requirements are in fact fulfilled, formal
recognition is extended by operation of international law. Under the
competing constitutive view, utilized primarily by the United
States,9 the extension of recognition is a completely discretionary
act. The decision to extend recognition could therefore be based on
additional political considerations. Realistic fulfillment of the re-
quirements for statehood0 is not in itself sufficient to compel
recognition. Utilizing the constitutive position, the United States ef-
fectively imposed the additional requirement of constitutional
legitimacy on any change in the governmental administration or
form of government." Constitutional legitimacy assured that a new
government had acquired power through the state's existing con-
stitutional processes. A successful revolutionary regime therefore
definitively failed the test of constitutional legitimacy, whereas
under the declaratory view the government's origins were inconse-
quential given the general acquiesence of the people concerned.
Although superficially in keeping with internationally recognized re-
quirements, American interpretation of the international law of
recognition is substantively antithetical to international interpreta-
tion.
5. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 101-02.
6. See notes 27-32 infra and accompanying text.
7. These requirements are commonly referred to as the prerequisites for
statehood. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
8. Under the declaratory theory of recognition the recognizing state declares
that the entity in question has in reality achieved the status of statehood. The declara-
tory view of recognition is opposed to the constitutive view. Under the constitutive
theory the state in question does not exist as a legal entity until recognition is ex-
tended. See notes 23-38 infra and accompanying text.
9. The United States and Great Britain are the only major powers which
utilize the constitutive theory of recognition. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 12-24.
10. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
11. For example Section 94 of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, states that:
When a change of governmental administration or a change in form of
government takes place in a state as a result of constitutional processes
or with the consent of the predecessor government, there is not occasion
for an act of recognition. Such occasion is, however, presented if the
recognized government is displaced by illegal or unconstitutional means.
I. at Comment d.
For a discussion of the origins of the concept of constitutional legitimacy, see
notes 54-59 infra and accompanying text.
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American recognition practices are not only at variance with
international consensus, but are additionally irreconcilable with
domestic policy on human rights and self-determination. 2 The
United States has traditionally been a conscientious proponent for
the observance of fundamental human rights;13 one of the elemen-
tary components of human rights is the right to self-determination."
Yet revolution resulting in the succession of a power with a com-
peting ideology, but in furtherance of the right to self-determination:,
has been systematically excluded from American recognition prac.
tices." Thus United States recognition policy has been irreconcilable
with domestic as well as international law.
One of the most pronounced manifestations of these conflicting
platforms was the China policy. The United States had refused to
recognize the People's Republic of China because the Chinese
government had emanated from a communist revolution." Since a
communist revolution failed the test of constitutional legitimacy, the
United States withheld recognition, hoping to impede communist ex-
pansion." Not only was the non-recognition of the PRC in opposition
to the right of self-determination, but the attendant recognition of
the stagnant Nationalist government on Taiwan impeded the native
Taiwanese" right to self-government. 9 Continuing formal recogni-
tion of the repressive Kuomintang' provided a legitimating factor
for the maintenance of martial law and the concommitant suspension
of the Nationalist Constitution.2' Under a continuing state of KMT
siege, the Taiwanese have been deprived of general elections' and
therefore of their right to self-determination. Hence, the United
12. Self-determination refers to the right of a people to choose their form of
government. See notes 90-113 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 114-21 infra and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Second Phase),
[1970] I.C.J. 304.
15. See generally L. GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS: THE
PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (1978) [hereinafter cited as GALLOWAY].
16. See note 136 infra and accompanying text.
17. 39 DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 385 (Aug. 11, 1958).
18. The native Taiwanese must be distinguished from the Nationalists on
Taiwan. The Nationalists are exiled mainlanders, whereas the native Taiwanese are
descendants of Chinese who emigrated from the mainland more than three hundred
years ago. See note 162 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 145-53 infra and accompanying text.
20. Hereinafter referred to as KMT. The KMT are party members of the Na-
tionalist government on Taiwan, exiled from the mainland in 1949 after the successful
communist revolution. See note 145 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 145-51 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 152-53 infra and accompanying text.
1979]
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States preoccupation with the non-legal consideration of a competing
communist ideology overrode the right of self-determination for both
the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.
This note serves to bring this previously ignored interrelation-
ship of self-determination and the international law of recognition into
sharper focus. The discussion necessarily begins with a close ex-
amination of the international legal nature and effect of recognition,
since it is within the parameters of this analysis that the United
States found legal license for its injection of non-legal considerations
into its recognition practices. The subsequent discussion of interna-
tional and American acceptance of self-determination as a fundamen-
tal legal right provides further foundation for the concept of human
rights as a governing principle of foreign relations law. In the final
examination of United States-China policy it then becomes evident
that the previous politically motivated recognition of the Republic of
China, to the exclusion of the People's Republic of China, resulted in
a subversion of both the native Taiwanese and the Communists'
right to self-determination.
United States foreign relations law has proven to be at
variance with both international consensus as to the legal nature of
recognition as well as domestic and international law on self-
determination. The policy of non-recognition of a government with a
competing ideology and the undeniable right of a people to choose
their form of government has been squarely in opposition under
American practice. It is only in President Carter's recognition of the
PRC that American interpretation of the law of recognition and self-
determination has inadvertently found consistent application. In
view of United States recogniton of the PRC, it is now time to re-
examine explicitly American interpretations of the international law
of recognition and self-detenmination, utilizing the Chinese question
as a guide. This re-examination necessarily begins with the interna-
tional analysis of the legal nature of recognition since United States
analysis was the first source of error leading to inconsistency in
American interpretation of international legal principles.
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVE
There are two seemingly mutually exclusive views" on the in-
23. The two views on recognition constitute a major dispute. The general
focus of this dispute is whether recognition is a legal obligation under international
law. This problem arises because international law is not necessarily statutory in ori-
gin. As outlined in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the
sources of international law include:
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ternational legal nature and effect of recognition: the constitutive'
and the declaratory25 views. Under the declaratory view, the legal
personality of a state is conferred upon completion of an objective
evaluation of the fulfillment of the requirements for statehood."
Under the competing constitutive view, recognition may be withheld
for purely subjective reasons despite objective fulfillment of these
requirements. United States adherence to the constitutive practice
has been largely responsible for considerable confusion in American
foreign policy. A comparative examination of these two theories of
recognition reveals the necessity for this conclusion.
The International Law of Recognition
The declaratory view of recognition is acknowledged under
general and traditional interpretations of international law." Under
the declaratory view, the legal personality of a state is conferred by
operation of law. If an objective evaluation results in a determina-
tion that the entity fulfills the requirements for statehood, 28 the ex-
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice as accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of rules of law.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1).
24. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 92-93; J. OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 126 (8th ed. 1955). Cf. Polish Upper Silesia Case, [1926] P.C.I.J., ser. A,
No. 7, at 28. (The holding that unrecognized Poland could not invoke a treaty against
Germany was largely based on the determination that the two nations had no contrac-
tual nexus.)
25. The number of international law scholars who adhere to this view of
recognition has increased in recent years. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 139 (6th ed. 1963); BRIGGS, supra
note 1, at 116; Kunz, Editwial Comment: Legal Aspects of the Situation in Korea, 44
AM. J. INT'L L. 709, 713 (1950). See also ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 39, 175-255, 300-05.
26. See note 28 infra.
27. For an historical view of recognition under traditional international law,
see V. LI, DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS 4-6 (1977).
28. Statehood refers to the factual existence of a state. The factual existence
of a state and the recognition of a state are often perceived as two distinct concepts.
There is considerably more agreement as to the factual prerequisites for statehood.
Under international law the political existence of a state is independent of the recogni-
tion of that state. For example Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention delineated the
requisites for statehood: "The state as a person of international law should possess the
following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) govern-
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isting state of law and fact is acknowledged by the extension of
recognition." For example, the internationally acclaimed Montevideo
ment; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other States." Convention on Rights
and Duties of States, Montevideo, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter cited as Montevideo Convention]. As indicated the United
States is a party to the Montevideo Convention. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1,
at § 100.
The distinction between recognized states and unrecognized entities which
nevertheless fulfill the above requirements for statehood is crucial. International law
applies only to states since states are considered the "persons" of international law. W.
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 300 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as BISHOP]. For example the United Nations International Court of Justice is open only
to states. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 35. The United Na-
tions Charter also provides that only states may be members. U.N. CHARTER art. 4.
Therefore if an entity fulfills the requirements for political existence as a state under
international law, it acquires certain rights and duties under international law. The
conditions for statehood under the Montevideo Convention, supra, are flexible. It has
been held that even if the borders of a new state have not been definitely drawn,
statehood can be accorded. Deutsche Kontinental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State, An-
nual Digest 5c (German-Polish Mixed Arb. Trib. 1929-30). See LAUTERPACHT. supra
note 1, at 30; RESTATEMENT. supra note 1, at § 100. The requirement that an entity
possess a government is usually interpreted to mean an independent government that
exercises effective authority within a defined area. See LAUTERPACHT. sUpra note 1, at
26-30. The interpretation of this requirement usually arises in connection with a new
government effectuated by a revolution. For example the RESTATEMENT provides that:
Before recognizing a revolutionary regime as a government of a state, the
recognizing state is required to make a determination, reasonably based
upon fact, that the regime
(a) is in control of the territory and population of the state; or
(b) is in control of a substantial part of the territory and popula-
tion of the state and shows reasonable promise that it will succeed in dis-
placing the previous government in the territory of the state.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 101. In the case of revolutionary regimes the govern-
ment must be independent of the parent state. This independence need not be ex-
pressly recognized by the parent state. The parent state's refusal to extend recogni-
tion is not conclusive. In the event of refusal, the independence of the new government
must be separately evaluated. In addition an independent government must exercise
effective authority over the territory which it claims as evidenced by the habitual
obedience of the bulk of the population. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 115-40. In
summary the various requirements for statehood as provided for in the Montevideo
Convention are inextricably intertwined. The existence of a permanent population and
a defined territory connote the existence of a stable community and therefore an effec-
tive government. Consequently many states exist which have unusual legal status,
such as the British Empire. See Report of Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of Im-
perial Conference of 1926, Cmd. No. 2768, at 13-15 (1927). If these states are able to
carry out their international obligations, the fourth and most important requirement of
statehood under the Montevideo Convention, their idiosyncrasies do not deprive the
entity of statehood. See generally BISHOP, supra note 24, at 313-33.
29. In contrast declarativists have understandably never termed recognition
as an entitlement, nor has any aspiring state asserted refusal of recognition as a cause
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1979], Art. 6
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Convention on the Rights and Duties of States," essentially ex-
pounds the declaratory view:
The political existence of a state is independent of
recognition of other states. Even before recognition the
state has the right to defend its integrity and in-
dependence, to provide for its conservation, prosperity
and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to
legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to
define its competence and jurisdiction of its courts. The
exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the
exercise of the rights of other states according to interna-
tional law."l
Accordingly, declarativists view the act of recognition as an objec-
tive acknowledgment that a given entity fulfills the requirements
for statehood. Given the existence of statehood, recognition is duly
accorded.2
Since the extension of recognition is simply an objective
acknowledgment of reality, declarativists assert that the decision to
recognize should be completely divorced from any moral or ethical
judgments on the part of the recognizing state.' Since the legal per-
sonality of the state has already arisen by operation of law,"
the subsequent declarativist extension of formal recognition is
simply a statement of legal fact. Declarativist reasoning is replete
throughout international court decisions and boasts substantial state
practice. 5  For example, in the landmark Tinoco Claims
of action in either an international or domestic forum. This may reflect less on the ex-
tension of recognition as a legal duty than as an implicit realization that forced
recognition would result in hollow compliance with the formalities of extending
recognition. The blow of non-recognition is also softened by the knowledge that if the
entity fulfills the requirements of statehood, basic international legal rights inevitably
accrue. See also notes 36-39 infra and accompanying text.
30. Montevideo Convention, supra note 28.
31. Id at T.S. No. 882 (emphasis added).
32. See BRIERLY, supra note 25.
33. Borchard, Recognition and Non-Recognition, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 108, 108-10
(1942); Williams, Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in International Law,
47 HARV. L. REV. 776, 793 (1934). See H. KELSEN, DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERANITAT
224-41 (1921). Cf. Kelsen, Recognition in International Law, Theoretical Observations,
35 AM. J. INT'L L. 605, 607-09 (1941) (Professor Kelsen distinguished between legal
recognition, which is a declaratory act, and political recognition, which is a purely dis-
cretionary act.)
34. See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text. See generally BROWNLIE,
supra note 1, at 90-93.
35. See Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Claim, I.L.R. 30, 168 (United States Foreign
19791
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Arbitration, Chief Justice Taft, sitting as arbitrator, warned that
recognition withheld on the basis of considerations other than an ob-
jective evaluation of the fulfillment of the requirements for
statehood had little bearing on the de facto 7 existence of the
government3' Thus, international decisions provide definitive sup-
port for the declarativist proposition that non-legal considerations
are misplaced in the international law of recognition.
Despite this showing of substantial international consensus
regarding the nature of recognition, the competing constitutive
theory commands equally compelling support in light of the realities
of international relations. There is no explicit duty to recognize any
state under international law. 9 From this premise constitutivists
assert that the extension of recognition is a discretionary act. Since
Claims Settlement Commission 1959); BISHOP. supra note 24, at 386; BRIGGS. supra note
1, at 197. But see J. FALK, THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 583 (1968). See
also Clerget v. Representation Commerciale de la Republique democratique du Viet
Nam, 96 J.D.I. 894, 898 (1969); Deutsche Kontinental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State,
Annual Digest 5e (German-Polish Mixed Arb. Trib. 1929-30).
36. Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britian v. Costa Rica) 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l
Awards 369 (1924).
37. Apart from the two theories of recognition (declarative and constitutive)
there are also two types of recognition utilized under both theories: de jure and de fac-
to. One of the primary occasions for the distinction occurs when a state first appears
as an independent entity under the control of a provisional government. Recognition is
usually extended on a de facto basis until the recognizing state feels assured that the
new entity will maintain power. If in the judgment of the recognizing state the new en-
tity fulfills the requirements of statehood, recognition is usually extended on a de jure
basis. See BRIGGS. supra note 1, at 103; HACKWORTH. supra note 1, at 199-222. For exam-
ple, on May 14, 1948 the Provisional Government of Israel proclaimed itself an in-
dependent republic. President Truman immediately recognized the provisional govern-
ment as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel. 18 DEPT STATE BULL.. No.
464 at 673 (May 23, 1948). On October 24, President Truman explained that de jure
recognition would be extended when a permanent government was elected. 19 DEPT
STATE BULL.. No. 488 at 582 (Oct. 24, 1948). After elections were held on January 25,
the United States government extended de jure recognition to the government of
Israel effective January 31, 1949. 20 DEPT STATE BULL.. No. 502 at 205 (Feb. 13, 1949).
38. Tinoco Claims Arbitration, 1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Awards at 384.
39. Since the formal extension of recognition has never been asserted as a legal
right, it is necessarily a discretionary act. See note 29 supra. The legal rights that ac-
crue by virtue of recognition must be distinguished from the legal rights acquired by
virtue of de facto fulfillment of the requirements of statehood. See note 28 supra. For
example although only states may be members of the United Nations many entities
not yet recognized by the United States are members of the United Nations. Such a
situation results when the United States refuses to formally recognize a state which
has objectively fulfilled the requirements for statehood under the Montevideo Conven-
tion. Therefore the state acquires a right to membership in the United Nations
although it may not have the rights of a state in United States forums due to its
unrecognized status. See notes 60-66 infra and accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1979], Art. 6
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the decision to extend recognition is discretionary, constitutive
adherents feel free to withhold recognition regardless of whether
the prospective state fulfills the requirements for statehood. Indeed,
under the constitutive view, a state does not even legally exist
without formal recognition. 0 The very personality of a state thereby
depends upon the political decision of other states to extend recogni-
tion."1
40. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 93.
41. But many conceptual difficulties arise with adherence to the constitutive
doctrine. Certainly the existence of a state in the international community should not
be subject to purely political determination by other states. The existence of a state in
the international community must be subject to determination utilizing principles of in-
ternational law. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 93. A third and eclectic view has arisen
out of this quagmire of interpretive debate. It has been suggested that although
recognition is constitutive there is a legal duty to recognize:
In essence [recognition] is a discretion determined by international law. In
granting or refusing recognition the state administers international law.
It does not perform a legally indifferent act of national policy. Although
states enjoy freedom of decision in ascertaining the facts and in assessing
their significance with regard to recognition, they are not free to assert
the liberty to disregard the facts or to act in defiance of them. There is
little substance in the assertion that a state commences its international
existence with the concommitant rights and duties as soon as it exists. To
the contrary, recognition when given in fulfillment of a legal duty as an
act of application of international law is momentous, decisive, and an in-
dispensable function of ascertaining and declaring the existence of the re-
quisite elements of statehood with the constitutive effect for the com-
mencement of international rights and duties in question. Once we have
assimilated the idea that recognition is not primarily a manifestation of
national policy but the fulfillment of an international duty we shall
remove the principle objection to the acceptance of the view that recogni-
tion marks the rise of international rights and duties of a state.
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 61-63 (emphasis added). This view is similar to the
declaratory view in that it dismisses the discretionary factor in according recognition.
But it additionally acknowledges the constitutive effect of the act of recognition. See
WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 15-17. Contra, Kunz, supra note 25, at 713-19. As a resolu-
tion it has been suggested that there simply is a legal duty to recognize the state for
certain purposes without forcing the recognizing state to make a public or formal
declaration of recognition:
[Tlhere is a legal duty to "recognize" for certain purposes at least, but no
duty to make an express, public, and political determination of the ques-
tion or to declare readiness to enter into diplomatic relations by means of
recognition. This latter type of recognition remains political and discre-
tionary. Even recognition is not determinant of diplomatic relations, and
absence of diplomatic relations is not in itself non-recognition of the state.
BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 95.
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United States Utilization of the Constitutive Theory of Recognition
Despite general international support for the declarative posi-
tion, the United States steadfastly utilizes the constitutive doctrine
of recogniton.4 2 Under United States practice, a state has discre-
tionary power to recognize a new regime which has displaced a
formerly recognized government"3 by revolutionary and therefore
unconstitutional means. Consequently, the United States has tradi-
tionally utilized recognition as a political tool." George Washington
used formal recognition to support anti-monarchical governments;'5
Theodore Roosevelt used it to advance economic imperialism;"4
Woodrow Wilson used it to promote constitutional governments;'7
42. Accordingly the United States does not subscribe to Lauterpacht's ad-
monishment that there is a legal duty to recognize. See note 41 supra and accompany-
ing text. Evidence of this peculiarly American interpretation of international law may
be found in the RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 99: "A state is not required by inter-
national law to recognize an entity as a state, or regime as a government of the state."
Id- See also Preparatory Study Concerning a Draft Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of States, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN. 4/2 at 192-94 (1948).
43. Since recognition may be accorded either a government or a state, the
two must be distinguished. A government may change but the state remains. Con-
versely a new state may arise thereby instituting a new government. Therefore,
recognition of a government and a state may be closely related but they are not
necessarily identical. A government is simply one component of a state. When there is
a change only in the governmental administration there is usually no occasion for the
act of recognition. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11. But if there is a drastic change in
political ideologies, the recognition of the previous state does not necessarily continue
to apply to the new regime. This distinction between the government of a state and
the state is closely related to the principle of continuity of states. The concept of con-
tinuity of states simply acknowledges the instance where the administrative machinery
of the state changes but the basic structure and physical boundaries of the state re-
main unchanged. See BRIGGS, supra note 1, at 209-13; H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 383-87 (1959); WHITEMAN. supra note 1, at 754-99.
44. GALLOWAY. supra note 15, at 1. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon,
Galloway suggests:
The importance attached to recognition derives in part from the weight of
tradition and in part from the sense of legitimacy recognition confers.
And because states granting or receiving recognition perceive the act as
important, they have made it a precondition for other actions that do
have inherent significance, such as the continuance of aid or the resump-
tion of diplomatic relations.
I& at 11.
45. Id at 1.
46. See T. COLE. THE RECOGNITION POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1901 43
(1928).
47. Within a few days after his inauguration, President Wilson declared:
Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly
processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or ir-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1979], Art. 6
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and Dwight D. Eisenhower used it in an attempt to inhibit the
spread of communism.'8 This varied use of formal recognition readily
evidences the United States historical adherence to the subjectively
oriented constitutive view.
In contrast early United States policy closely resembled the
declarative view. The initial statement of United States policy can
be traced to the correspondence of Thomas Jefferson. In a letter to
Governeur Morris, the American Minister at Paris, Jefferson
delineated three prerequisites for recognition.49 First, there must
have been governmental control of the administrative machinery of
the state.5 Secondly, the new government must have demonstrated
"general acquiesence of the people."5' Finally, the new government
must have had the ability and willingness to discharge its interna-
tional obligations.2 Today's declaratory practice substantially mir-
rors Jefferson's articulation of United States recognition policy.'
The Jeffersonian concept of recognition survived until the
beginning of the twentieth century. In the early 1900's, however, a
series of revolutions in Central and South America provoked a visi-
regular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republic
governments everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon
the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without
order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We
shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse,
respect, and helpfulness between out sister republics and ourselves. We
shall lend our influence of every kind to the realization of these principles
in fact and practice, knowing that disorder, personal intrigues, and de-
fiance of constitutional rights weaken and discredit government and in-
jure none so much as the people who are unfortunate enough to have
their common life and their common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We
can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of govern-
ment to advance their own personal interests or ambitions.
HACKWORTH, supra note 1, at 181.
48. For example in 1956 the United States recognized a military junta which
overthrew the elected president of Honduras because the junta was friendly to the
United States and was anti-Communist. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. POLICY TOWARD
LATIN AMERICA: RECOGNITION AND NON-RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS AND INTERRUP-
TIONS IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 1933-1974 58-59 (1975).
49. Correspondence of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, with Governeur
Morris, American Minister at Paris, November 7, 1792 and March 12, 1793, as re-
printed in MOORE, supra note 1, at 119.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Most importantly neither the form of government nor the means
employed to effect the change in government were articulated as conditions for
recognition. Id. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 103.
53. Indeed it was a succinct articulation of the declaratory view. See notes
27-32 supra and accompanying text.
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ble shift in the American approach." By withholding recognition
President Wilson manifested disapproval of a new regime, effectively
isolating the new government and placing it at a disadvantage in its
international relations.5 With the advent of President Wilson's
recognition policy, the United States began to evaluate subjectively
the requirement that a state have the support of the people. These
increasingly subjective evaluations evolved into an explicit require-
ment that the new government attain power in accordance with the
foreign states' constitutional processes,"6 effectively excluding any
revolutionary regime from formal recognition. 7 Under the American
view a revolutionary regime prima facie lacked the support of the
people. Whether the revolutionary government exhibited firm con-
trol did not seem to affect American decisions to extend or withhold
recognition." Since the United States did not approve of the means
utilized to attain power, it would superciliously withhold recognition
on the alleged basis that the new government had not fulfilled
recognition requirements. 9 President Wilson's practices transformed
the once objective Jeffersonian concept of recognition into a tool
demonstrative of political disapproval.
These increasingly subjective judgments converted recognition
into a powerful political weapon with far-reaching legal conse-
quences.' In particular, domestic court decisions are obliged to
54. For a more extensive analysis, see GALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 27-29 and
accompanying text.
55. See notes 61-64 infra and accompanying text.
56. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 101, Comment a.
57. This legitimacy requirement is surprising given the revolutionary origin
of the United States government. See note 92 infra and accompanying text. When Jef-
ferson first elaborated on the conditions for extension of recognition, he noted:
We surely can not deny to any nation that right whereon our own
Government is founded-that evdry one govern itself according to
whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that
it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ
it thinks proper, whether King, convention, assembly, committee, Presi-
dent, or anything else that it may choose. The will of the nation is the on-
ly thing essential to be regarded.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 7 (1950) (emphasis added).
58. V. LI, DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS 6 (1977).
59. Id.
60. It is generally agreed that recognition does give rise to rights and duties
under international law. Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 107 with RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 1, at § 112. There are instances where rights do not accrue to an un-
recognized state. Id. at § 107. Even the government of a state which has lost control over
the major portion of the states' territory may exercise the states' rights and is obliged to
perform its obligations under international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 111.
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reflect American recognition policies. 1 A United States court will
not acknowledge the existence of a foreign sovereign unless formally
recognized by the executive branch.2 If a foreign government is not
formally recognized, the state lacks comity privileges and can not
bring an action in American courts as a matter of right.62 Conse-
quently many court decisions have held that an unrecognized regime
has no legal rights in United States forums.6 ' The only exception
Recognition may, however, be conditionally granted. Any agreements incident to recog-
nition have a binding effect and may vary the rights and duties of the states involved.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 112.
61. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). In Pink the United States
Supreme Court denied the right of New York State to refuse enforcement of the Lit-
vinov Assignment. Under the Litvinov Assignment the United States exchanged for-
mal recognition of the Russian Government for the assumption of Russian nationalized
assets. Mr. Justice Douglas concluded:
It was the judgment of the political department that full recogni-
tion of the Soviet Government required the settlement of all outstanding
problems including the claims of our nationals. Recognition and the Lit-
vinov Assignment were interdependent. We would usurp the executive
function if we held that that decision was not final and conclusive in the
courts.
Id. at 320. Since recognition is a political executive function, agreements incident to
recognition must be given effect in domestic forums. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); San-
tovincenzo V. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931).
In contrast if a decree enacted by a government is contrary to United States
public opinion it need not be enforced in American courts. In such an instance, non-
recognition of the government has no effect and the internal policy of the United
States prevails. This is in accord with the policy that foreign acts of state are to be
given effect in United States courts only if they are consistent with United States in-
ternal policy. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (Recogniton of the Soviet
government by the President of the United States in conjunction with the establish-
ment of normal diplomatic relations validated all acts of Soviet government with
respect to the nationalization of a Russian corporation having a deposit in an American
bank.); Vladikavkassky Co. Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456
(1934) (Decree by Russian government dissolving a railroad corporation was not suffi-
cient to destroy its legal right under New York law to sue for funds deposited in an
American bank as the dissolution and confiscation was against the public policy of the
State.)
62. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000,
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (A Latvian corporation could not bring an ac-
tion in United States courts in view of deliberate non-recognition of the incorporation
of Latvia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
63. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139
N.E. 259 (1923) (The Russian Soviet government was not permitted to maintain a suit
in a New York court absent recognition of that government by the United States.)
64. See The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944) (American non-recognition of
Estonia precluded recovery by Estonian Steamship Company of claim brought under
Merchant Marine Act.) See also Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v.
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arises when an unrecognized foreign government has affected
domestic private rights. In that instance American courts
acknowledge the government's de facto existence in an effort to gain
redress for American grievances.65 Despite this sole exception,
unrecognized governments are at a distinct disadvantage in foreign
relations with the United States by virtue of their unrecognized
status."'
There are apparent major defects in the American con-
stitutivist approach. Initially, as evidenced by Tinoco Claims Ar-
bitration, 7 non-legal considerations of competing ideologies are ir-
relevant in the international law of recognition. More importantly,
however, even assuming the existence of legal license to consider
non-legal factors, a state should not utilize recognition to deny the
overriding international legal right to self-determination." Interna-
tional law theoretically does not refuse recognition to aspiring
governments which employ revolution in furtherance of the right to
self-determination given the general acquiesence of the people.6 In
this vein an international legal scholar has observed that:
McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Estonian S.S. Line
v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 477 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S.
Line v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 717 (Ct. Cl. 1953); A/S Merilaid & Co. v. Chase Na-
tional Bank, 189 Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
65. In this vein Secretary of State John Foster Dulles observed that the dis-
tinction between de jure and de facto recognition involves a play on words to some ex-
tent. Those governments that are not de jure recognized are not necessarily viewed as
legally incompetent or nonexistent. 39 DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 1011 at 733 (Nov. 10,
1958).
66. It is important to note at this juncture that recognition is not synonymous
with diplomatic relations. Informal relations may be, and often are, conducted with the
officials of a state or government without implying recognition. HACKWORTH, supra
note 1, at 327. See, e.g., id. at 281 (informal relations with unrecognized Albania); Id. at
332-33 (consular officers stationed in unrecognized Manchukuo).
67. Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), 1 U.N. Int'l Arb.
Awards 369 (1924).
68. See notes 81-83 infra and accompanying text.
69. 12 WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 1-311. Accord, R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
211-13. In examining the propriety of an invitation to a foreign government to assist in
suppressing an internal revolt, Higgins cautions:
The further proviso is needed that the insurgents represent the majority
of the people. This is in keeping with the principle of self-determination,
which has, over the last fifteen years, led to widespread view that there
may now be a legal right of revolution.... [Tlhat is to say, that under the
principle of self-determination the peoples of a territory must be
allowed-if absolutely necessary by forceful means-to replace the
government by one of their own choice.
Id. (citations omitted). See 70 infra and accompanying text.
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There is no rule of international law forbidding revolu-
tions within a state, and the United Nations Charter
favors the "self-determination of peoples." Self-
determination may take the forms of rebellion to oust an
unpopular government, of colonial revolt, of an irredentist
movement to transfer territory, or of a movement
for the unification or federation of independent states.
There is nothing in the Charter to prevent the latter,
even if it destroys the independence of the participating
states after their union. Such a union occurred in the for-
mation of the United States in the 18th century, the for-
mation of Italy and Germany in the 19th century, and the
formation of the United Arab Republic in the 20th cen-
tury. If divisions of a state or unions of states are formed
primarily in accordance with the will of the peoples con-
cerned, even if accompanied by some violence, neither in-
ternational law nor the United Nations offers opposition.
If, on the other hand, such changes are effected primarily
by conquest, the case would be one of aggression, forbid-
den both by the Charter and by contemporary interna-
tional law.10
Yet the United States has traditionally withheld recognition from a
revolutionary government with a competing ideology. Therefore a
fundamental defect in the constitutive approach is the creation of an
opportunity to deny recognition in contravention of the right to self-
determination. This fundamental conflict becomes apparent given
the status of self-determination as a basic principle of international
law.
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES
An examination of the development of human rights in interna-
tional law provides a conclusive foundation for the assertion that
self-determination is an overriding principle of international law. In
addition the United States wholehearted subscription to self-
determination as a fundamental legal right raises genuine confusion
when superimposed on the American practice of denying formal
recognition to a revolutionary government which nevertheless has
the irrefutable support of the people governed.
70. Wright, United States Intervention in Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112,
121 (1959).
19791
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Development of Human Rights as International Law
General principles of law71 acquire their legal effect by their
nature as fundamental, inalienable or inherent rights."2 Extensive
judicial and philosophical recognition of the existence of fundamen-
tal principles resulted in the formation of a body of jus cogens.7" In
the enumeration of jus cogens, philosophers and scholars typically
included the prohibition of aggressive war, ' genocide,"5 racial in-
equality,76 crimes against humanity,77 trade in slaves, and piracy.78
Due to the fundamental nature of these prohibitions, eminent opin-
71. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(1)(c). See also
note 23 supra; BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 15-18.
72. See generally VanDijk, International Law and the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1529 (1978). The concept of human rights can
be traced to the philosophies of ancient Greece. Greek philosophers laid the foundation
for the school of natural law, which recognized certain inviolate human rights implied
from the consistency observed in human nature. The concept of natural law found later
support in Stoa, a philosophic school that greatly influenced Roman legal philosophy.
See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 80-84 (1950). Addi-
tionally the Catholic doctrine of natural law, developed in the Middle Ages, proposed
the law of God as having higher rank than secular rules. In this Catholic doctrine are
the seeds of self-determination. Since secular rules derived their power from the con-
sent of those they governed, the Church concluded that peoples may rise "against
tyranny and invoke their God given rights and freedoms against their rulers." VanDijk,
supra, at 1530. During the Reformation and Enlightenment, John Locke promoted
fundamental and inviolate individual rights which must be guaranteed by governments
and which could be invoked against oppressive rulers. In the eighteenth century, the
American Revolution was founded upon the belief in the right to rebel against
repressive governments as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. And in the
twentieth century, Marxist criticisms of capitalistic society stressed the importance of
social and economic rights as well as civil and political freedoms. A. ROBERTSON,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 8-10 (1972). See also LAUTERPACHT, supra, at 89-91. The
belief in the existence of a set of fundamental and inalienable rights has a long and for-
midable history.
73. For clarity jus cogens may be viewed as synonymous with public policy.
For a critical and somewhat pessimistic analysis, see Schwarzenberger, International
Jus Cogens?, 43 TEX. L. REV. 455 (1965).
74. L. MCNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 214-15 (1961).
75. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Second Phase) (Belgium v.
Spain), [19701 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32. A concise analysis and thorough background for Barce-
lona Traction may be found at Annals of Finance: Privateer I, The New Yorker 42,
May 21, 1979, and Annals of Finance: Privateer II, The New Yorker 42, May 28, 1979.
76. The United Nations Charter prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
language or religion in articles 1(3), 13(1), 55, 56, 62(2) and 76. E.g., Barcelona Traction,
[1970] I.C.J. Rep. at 304 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion); South West Africa Case (Sec-
ond Phase), [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 1, 298 (Tanaka, J., dissenting). See also BROWNLIE, supra
note 1, at 578-81.
77. South West Africa Case, [1966] I.C.J. Rep. at 298.
78. Id.
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ions have recently acknowledged the imperative force of jus cogens
as principles of international law. For example, in Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light and Power Co., Limited, (Second Phase79, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice commented that: "[O]bligations derive, for ex-
ample, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts
of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protec-
tion from slavery and racial discrimination."'' Furthermore jus
cogens acquired the status of overriding principles of law.8 In this
sense they can be waived or contravened only by the formation of a
subsequent overriding customary rule of law.82 The body of jus cogens
therefore withstands both mutual and unilateral decisions to sus-
pend its operation in international relations."
The concept of jus cogens has recently found worldwide ar-
ticulation in the concern for human rights. Spurred into action by
World War II atrocities,' the United Nations promulgated the initial
79. [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 3.
80. Id. at 32.
81. Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
for jus cogens as a paramount consideration:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969). Accord, N.
BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 293 (6th ed. 1963); L. EZEJIOFOR, PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 60 (1964); A. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 113-15 (1962); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 119 (1963); F. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 91 (1949); U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-53
(1972); H. WALDOCK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10 (1969).
82. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969) at art.
53.
83. Id. By way of illustration:
An agreement by a state to allow another state to stop and search its
ships on the high seas is valid, but an agreement with a neighbouring
state to carry out a joint operation as against a racial group straddling
the frontier which would constitute genocide, if carried out, is void since
the prohibition with which the treaty conflicts is a rule of jus cogens.
BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 500-01.
84. World War II and the concommitant Fascist genocide policies provoked
not only United Nations actions but individual attempts to effectuate human rights
guarantees. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A (III), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948); H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNA-
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codification of human rights in the United Nations Charter.m  The
principal purposes of these human rights mandates were a global
guarantee of humane living conditions and the protection of basic
rights and freedoms from the misuse of governmental power." Thus
it was from the United Nations Charter that the international legal
basis for human rights evolved.
Initially the major impediment to worldwide acceptance of
Charter principles as binding rules of law stemmed from the general
nature of the language employed to articulate the concept of human
rights. 7 Reluctant governments sought refuge in the Charter's lack
of specificity." Although the language of the Charter is undeniably
TIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS OF MAN (1945); McDougal, Lasswell & Lung-Chu Chen, Human
Rights & World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 237 (1968).
85. U.N. CHARTER art. 1 para. 3; art. 55 para. c; art. 56; art. 62 para. 2; art. 68;
art. 76 para. c.
86. Id
87. For example, Article 1 broadly defines a purpose of the United Nations as
developing "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures
to strengthen universal peace." U.N. CHARTER art. 1 para. 2. Similarly Article 55 pro-
vides:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
the United Nations shall promote:
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion.
Id. at art. 55 para. c.
88. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text. Articles 55 and 1(2) have
been the principal source of reliance for actions brought against oppressive govern-
ments. Two primary questions arise in adjudicating such a suit: first, whether the
Charter provides sufficient basis for holding that a violation of international law has
occurred, and secondly whether there is a standing to sue. Addressing the first ques-
tion in light of the history of human rights, it becomes obvious that:
The relevant provisions of the Charter were not creative of a new rule of
law. All they did was to confirm and lay down in writing a principle which
had long been growing and maturing in international society until it
gained general recognition. By including and laying it down as one of the
principles of the new-born organization, the Charter gave expression to
one of the elements of international law of the time.
LACHS, The Law in and of the United Nations, 1 IND. J. INT'L L. 429, 432 (1961). Addi-
tionally article 55 must be read in conjunction with article 56 which provides that all
states agree to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for
the achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55. Nevertheless attempts made
by private individuals to invoke the provisions of articles 55 and 56 have been denied
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general, subsequent resolutions by the United Nations General
Assembly have authoriatively elaborated the scope and meaning of
the concept of human rights." With the added force from General
Assembly passage of these specific resolutions, contumacious
governments may no longer find refuge in the broadness of Charter
principles.
Self-De termination
One of the most significant Charter provisions is the right of
self-determination of peoples.9 Exercise and assertion of the right to
self-determination, however, occurred long before the Charter's pro-
mulgation. 1 The French and American Revolutions are notable
historical instances of the exercise of the right to self-deter-
mination." But the principle as a current doctrine of international
law found its initial proponent in Woodrow Wilson." Although
on the rationalization that the Charter, while binding on the United States as a treaty,
was not self-executing. Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Comacho v.
Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Fuji v. State, 28 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617
(1952); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110
(1953). On the other hand, if a state brings a claim against another state based upon an
alleged infringement of Charter human rights provisions, that state is not acting in its
own personal interest but as a representative of humankind. The violation does not
concern an obligation toward one or more states but an obligatio erga omnes-an
obligation towards everyone. Barcelona Traction, [19701 I.C.J. Rep. at 32. Thus stand-
ing is attained by virtue of a violation of an obligatio erga omnes, and a violation of
law occurs because political and judicial organs of the United Nations have interpreted
Articles 55 and 56 as delineating legal obligations. Adv. Op. on Namibia [1971] I.C.J.
Rep. 56; Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of
the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 351 (1972).
89. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, adopted March 4, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514 XV, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16),
U.N. Doe. A/4684 (1960); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6318 (1966);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 6, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
90. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
91. For example the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the American Declaration
of Independence of 1776, and the French Declaration des Droits de L'Homme et du
Citoyen of 1789 are just a few well-known declarations and implementations of the
right to self-determination. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 89-91 (1950); VanDijk, International Law and the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1529 (1978).
92. See A. COBBAN, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION (1944); Nawaz, The Mean-
ing and the Range of the Principle of Self-Determination, 1965 DUKE L.J. 82.
93. Curiously enough Woodrow Wilson was also the instigator for the consti-
tutional legitimacy prerequisite to recognition. See notes 54-59 supra and accompany-
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Wilson never specifically defined the principle of self-determination,
he insisted that: "National aspirations must be respected; peoples
may now be dominated and governed only by their consent. 'Self-
determination' is not a mere phrase, it is an imperative principle of
action."1' 4 In an effort to further this conviction, Wilson believed that
an international organization was necessary to transform the princi-
ple of self-determination into reality.95 In Wilson's view this was one
of the essential functions of the League of Nations." Although the
League did not maintain any specific provision for self-
determination,' the League's successor, the United Nations, utilized
ing text. Had early American leaders sought constitutional avenues in asserting self-
determination, the United States might have long remained just another British
colony. Perhaps less confusion arises when Wilson's recognition practices are viewed in
light of well-meaning but traditional American ethnocentricity. In recognizing the
inherent contradiction in Wilson's "constitutionally legitimatized self-determination,"
American recognition practices become saliently schizophrenic.
94. 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, WAR AND PEACE 180 (R. Baker
& W. Dodd eds. 1927).
95. Jessup, Self-Determination Today in Principle and Practice, 33 VA. Q.
174, 177 (1957).
96. "If the desire for self-determination of any peoples in the world is likely to
affect the peace of the world or the good understanding between nations, it becomes
the business of the League .... 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, WAR AND
PEACE 180 (R. Baker & W. Dodd eds. 1927). See A. COBBAN, supra note 91, at 44.
97. Article 3 of the original draft for the League of Nations Covenant contain-
ed provision for the principle of self-determination:
The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political in-
dependence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them
that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become
necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspira-
tions or social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-
determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judg-
ment of three fourths of thq Delegates, be demanded by the welfare and
manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable
to those peoples ....
M. LANSING, THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS- A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 93 (1921). The draft
article was eliminated at the Paris Peace Conference, however, due to strong opposi-
tion from the British Empire's representatives. Id. at 94-95. For the current British
position, see WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 110-13, 131-32. In spite of this deletion, the
League's International Committee of Jurists did have occasion to address the principle
of self-determination. In the Aaland Islands case the court was faced with Finnish
opposition to a Swedish self-determination claim. The Committee of Jurists cautiously
commented that:
[I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right
of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sover-
eignty of every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the
right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of
which they form a part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than
it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation.
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self-determination as a guilding principle." Charter recognition of
the right to self-determination was, therefore, deeply rooted in
historic pronouncements.
The right to self-determination appears in two articles of the
United Nations Charter: Article 1(2) and Article 55. Under Article 1,
one of the purposes of the United Nations is the development of
friendly relations among nations "based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."" Article 55 addi-
tionally urges United Nations members to promote certain goals
"with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being
which are necessary to the peaceful and friendly relations among na-
tions based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples . "..."100 However, the United Nations
General Assembly found it necessary and fruitful to expound upon
these articles in an effort to establish the right to self-determination
as an obligatory principle of international law.
United Nations efforts to define the scope of self-
determination culminated in the passage of numerous resolutions.''
For example, the Declaration Concerning the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Countries 2 declared that self-determination
included the right to determine political status and to pursue
economic, social and cultural development." 3 Incidental to the Col-
onial Resolution, a member of the General Assembly noted that it
applied to "all peoples in whatever land and in whatever cir-
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp. 1, at 22 (1920). More importantly given the
absence of any specific provision for self-determination in the Covenant, the Commit-
tee elaborated:
Under such circumstances [war and revolution] the principle of self-deter-
mination of peoples may be called into play. New aspirations of certain
sections of a nation, which are sometimes based on old traditions or on a
common language and civilization may come to the surface and produce
effects which must be taken into account in the interests of the internal
and external peace of nations.
The principle of recognizing the rights of peoples to determine
their political fate may be applied in various ways; the most important of
these are, on the one hand the formation of an independent State, and on
the other hand the right of choice between two existing States.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp. 3, at 6 (1920).
98. See notes 99-100 infra and accompanying text.
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
100. Id at art. 55.
101. See note 88 supra.
102. Adopted March 4, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514 XV, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
103. Id at 195.
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cumstances they are dominated and by whatever means they are
deprived of their right of self-determination and freedom."'"' With
the passage of these resolutions, the United Nations had definitively
countered arguments centering on the scope of self determination.
The principle of self-determination is, therefore, one of univer-
sal applicability. Self-determination reappears in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.' 5 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights'" is more specific with regard to self-deter-
mination than any of the preceding documents.0 7 This last covenant
is also much stronger in its position on the obligation of states to
respect political rights."8 The foregoing series of resolutions and
proposed covenants were not simply recommendations but were
authoritative interpretations of the Charter.'09 Therefore it can be
conclusively stated that self-determination is a legal principle. Since
these resolutions attained passage by majority vote,"' they have
become evidence of custom and thereby constitute general prin-
ciples of international law,"' binding on the United States as a
member of the United Nations and the international community.
104. U.N. GAOR 1256, U.N. Doc. A/945 (1960).
105. Adopted Dec. 6, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/811
(1948).
106. Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49,
U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966).
107. Article 1 states: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By vir-
tue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development." Id.
108. Article 2 states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Id. But see also Article 1, paragraph 2 which provides that States become parties
based on a promise to bring their legislation into line with the Covenant.
109. H. WALDOCK, 106 Hague RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL 33 (1962); 1961 Annual Report of the Secretary General 2 (1961). See note
111 infra and accompanying text.
110. U.N. CHARTER art. 18.
111. The principle of self-determination certainly qualifies as opinio juris sive
necessitatis. A forceful argument is put forth by Professor Van Dijk of the University
of Utrecht in The Netherlands:
When states act as a collectivity, such as in the framework of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, and formulate their opinion with regard
to the international recognition of human rights in a declaration or resolu-
tion such an action forms an important indication of that group's opinio
juris provided that this declaration or resolution rests upon a sufficient
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United States Human Rights Policies
In recent years the growing body of authority for the recogni-
tion of inviolate rights as part of the international legal order has
brought human rights issues into international focus. Particularly
with the advent of the Carter administration, the human rights
movement became a cause celebre for American foreign policy.
Carter's presidential campaign focused heavily on international
human rights. Reiterating this concern in his inaugural address,""
Carter urged that the United States had "a responsibility and a
legal right to express its dissapproval of violations of human
rights."' . This was not simply campaign rhetoric;" ' in 1977 Presi-
dent Carter signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights,"' and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,"' submitting them to the United States Senate for
ratification."7 With the signing of the convenants and the beginning
of the Carter administration, the United States became a visible
leader in the human rights campaign.
The United States Congress has also devoted serious atten-
tion to human rights. Preceding the Carter administration, a series
of congressional hearings in 1973 concentrated on international pro-
amount of consensus. On that basis one could argue, for instance, that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although it is not a treaty, has
become binding law as an international custom, due to the general sup-
port it has found at the moment of its adoption combined with the subse-
quent practice in the United Nations in its respect.
Van Dijk, supra note 91, at 1543. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
art. 38, para. b.
112. 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 122 (1977).
113. President Carter's News Conference, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 242
(Feb. 23, 1977); See also Address by President Carter to the United Nations General
Assembly, 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 332 (1977).
114. See Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Cove-
nants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35 (1978). See als.o note 115 infra and accompanying text.
115. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967). See Weissbrodt, supra note 114, at 35-37.
116. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967). See Weissbrodt, supra note 114, at 35-37.
117. The two Covenants were submitted to the Senate for ratification on Octo-
ber 5, 1977. On February 23, 1978 President Carter dispatched a letter to the Senate
proposing several reservations to the Covenants. In effect the proposed reservations
would subvert the Covenants to the Constitution and laws of the United States,
rendering the Covenants virtually ineffectual. For an excellent discussion of the pro-
posed reservations, see Weissbrodt, supra note 114, at 48-78.
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tection of human rights. 8 In sharp contrast to executive activity,
the United States legislature as well as domestic courts have been
reluctant to endorse the proposed human rights agreements as
legally binding."' In particular, United States courts have been reti-
cent in interpreting the provisions of the United Nations Charter as
legal obligations."' Instead the government preferred to treat Ar-
ticles 1(2), 55 and 56 simply as statements of purpose and therefore
not obligatory."' This indiscriminate interpretation of the Charter
provisions stemmed less from genuine concern over legitimacy of
the provisions than from the fear of international interference in
domestic affairs." Fear of interference also prompted considerable
congressional opposition to the signing and ratification of the two
human rights covenants."' The reserved domain of domestic jurisdic-
tion was allegedly in jeopardy."" Consequently the fear of interna-
tional scrutiny butressed by the scholarly debate centering on the
vagueness of Articles 1(2) and 55 provided a formidible barrier to
the ratification and implementation of the human rights covenants.
These barriers to the recognition of human rights provisions
have finally begun to deteriorate. President Carter's political exhor-
tations have aided in substantially changing American foreign policy
on human rights as legal obligations and not simply a subject for in-
ternational moralizing. Therefore, even unratified, the human rights
covenants provide substantial basis in international law for the
118. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); House Subcomm. on International
Organizations and Movements, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR
U.S. LEADERSHIP 9-11, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1974).
119. See Hudson, Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44
AM. J. INT'L L. 543, 544-46 (1950).
120. McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community, 59
YALE L.J. 60 (1949); Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights
Provisions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643 (1951).
121. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pub. No. 2349, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE 116 (1945). See also Hudson,
Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 543, 546
(1950).
122. See Schachter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights
Policies, 24 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 63, 67 (1978).
123. In 1976 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights came into effect and
are legally binding on those nations which have ratified them. See Human Rights In-
ternational Instruments 12 (1978), U.N. Doc. ST/HR/4; Weissbrodt, supra note 114, at
40.
124. lId
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obligatory force of the Charter's human rights provisions. The
United States government now acknowledges the obligatory
character of the human rights articles and has concluded that states
are accountable for the observance of human rights.2 ,
Despite the established obligatory character of the human
rights provisions, the search for appropriate and effective modes of
disapproval for violations constitutes another formidable barrier to
implementation of human rights. Some of the many difficulties pre-
sented are due to the universal applicability of the human rights
decrees and the subsequent difficulty in ascertaining violations, as
well as the possibly serious diplomatic ramifications of public con-
demnation of a neighboring state.'6 In a conscious effort to provide
a workable solution, the United States Congress in the Foreign
Assistance Act'" authorized the termination and reduction of eco-
nomic and military aid to "any government which engages in a con-
sistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights."'2 8 Deprivation of economic aid has furnished a power-
ful means for exhibition of United States commitment to respect for
fundamental international legal principles.
Although the Foreign Assistance Act provides an effective
deterrent, surely the United States may develop more efficacious
solutions. Recognition policies provide a unique and compelling op-
portunity for the United States to assert its belief in the principle of
self-determination.' Historical reluctance to recognize communism
and/or revolutionary governments has ignored the attendant oppor-
tunity to advance human rights and the self-determination of peo-
ples. As suggested by Professor Weissbrodt:'0
125. Address by President Carter to the United Nations General Assembly, 76
DEP'T STATE BULL. 332 (1977); Vance, 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 505 (1977).
126. Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and United States Foreign Policy,
7 GA. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 283-84 (1977).
127. 22 U.S.C. § 278 (1976).
128. Id. at § 262d.
129. Indeed they are obliged to do so under U.N. CHARTER art. 56 and 22
U.S.C. § 2304 (1976), which reads:
It is the policy of the United States in accordance with its international
obligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations . . . to pro-
mote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction .... To this end, a principal goal of
the foreign policy of the United States is to promote the increased ob-
servance of international human rights by all countries.
Id
130. Weissbrodt, supra note 126.
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Administration strategists may have decided that the
United States must have a positive international rallying
call rather than the tired negative imperative of anti-com-
munism. In this view the United States will talk about
human rights just as the Soviets and the third world raise
exploitation and imperialism as their issues. In other
words, human rights can be used as a legitimating theory
for other American foreign rights policies.''
In this regard the denial of recognition to a successful and popularly
supported revolutionary government is refusal of the universal right
to self-determination;32 recognition of an oppressive and stagnant
government is a denial of a peoples' fundamental right to self-
government. More specifically, as will be seen, the withholding of
recognition from the People's Republic of China refused the commu-
nists' right to self-determination; recognizing the repressive and
minority Kuomintang denied the Taiwanese their fundamental right
to self-government. Recognition did indeed prove to be a powerful
political tool.
RECOGNITION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
United States policy on recognition of the People's Republic of
China [PRC] has been devastatingly complex. Despite formal policy
to the contrary, United States practice did not deny the reality of
the PRC's existence." Even during the decades of non-recognition,
an international legal scholar suggested that mainland China was a
de facto government in the same sense used in Tinoco Claims Arbi-
tration."' Moreover there was no doubt that the United States de
facto recognized Communist China.3 5 The confusing policy of
withholding de jure recognition proceeded solely from the conviction
131. 1& at 283-84.
132. See note 91 infra and accompanying text.
133. During an interview Secretary of State Dulles revealed:
The question of recognition involves to some extent a play on words.
There is no doubt we recognize Communist China as a fact, as we deal
with Communist China. Indeed, I suspect that the United States has had
more continuous serious dealings with Communist China than any other
free-world country over the last 10 years .... It's a fact and we deal with
it as a fact, and whenever it is advantageous to the world or for peace to
do business with it, we don't hesitate to do business with it.
39 DEP'T. STATE BULL. No. 1011 at 733 (Nov. 10, 1958).
134. (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), 1 U.N. Int'l Arb. Awards 369 (1924).
135. See note 133 supra.
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that formal recognition would have "been of material assistance to
attempts to extend communist dominion. '""l Accordingly, in a
countermove to impede communist expansion, the United States de
jure recognized the Nationalist government fortressed on Taiwan.'
The United States admitted communist reality on the mainland, but
reserved legal recognition for the Nationalists.
Reality of the PRC's Existence
A brief examination of China's political history will reveal the
unreality of the United States prolonged recognition of the Republic
of China [ROC] as the de jure government of Taiwan and the main-
land. Although the Chinese established a settlement in Taiwan in
the sixth century, a formal Chinese government was not established
until the island was captured from the Dutch in 1661. After an at-
tempt to restore the Ming Dynasty, Taiwan was surrendered to the
Ch'ing Empire which administered the island as part of the main-
land's Fukien Province. In 1895, nine years after the establishment
of Taiwan as a separate province, the island was ceded through the
Treaty of Shimonoseki" as a result of China's defeat in the First
Sino-Japanese War. With China's declaration of war against Japan
in 1941, the ROC government, still on the mainland, repudiated the
Treaty with Japan. In 1945 Japan signed the Instrument of Sur-
render thereby accepting the Potsdam Proclamation which demanded
the return of Taiwan to the ROC. The transfer was incomplete, how-
ever, since international law requires a treaty or a unilateral re-
nunciation and subsequent de facto control by the transferee to
effect a change in territorial sovereignty."9 This requirement was not
136. 39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 385 (Aug. 11, 1958). Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles elaborated:
Basically the United States policy of not extending diplomatic recognition
to the Communist regime in China proceeds from the conviction that such
recognition would produce no tangible benefits to the United States or to
the free world as a whole and would be of material assistance to Chinese
Communist attempts to extend Communist dominion ....
The extension of diplomatic recognition by a greater power nor-
mally carries with it not only increased access to international councils
but enhanced international standing and prestige as well. Denial of recog-
nition on the other hand is a positive handicap to the regime affected and
one which makes it that much the more difficult for it to pursue its for-
eign policies with success.
Id
137. I&
138. The Treaty of Shimonoseki has been reproduced at 3 WHITEMAN, supra
note 1, at 565-66.
139. See HACKWORTH, supra note 1, at 421; WHITEMAN, supra note 1 at 1088-89.
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met until Japan signed the San Francisco peace treaty in 1951,
which provided for Japanese renunciation of sovereignty over
Taiwan. In 1949, however, a successful communist rebellion on the
mainland forced the ROC retreat to Taiwan. Since the convening
parties in San Francisco could not agree on the de jure government
of China, neither the ROC nor the PRC was invited to participate at
the Conference. Since there was technically no transferee, Taiwan
had been abandoned, not surrendered. At that point neither the
ROC nor the PRC acquired de jure title to Taiwan."'
A candid evaluation of the ROC's status would have revealed
that the ROC had not fulfilled the requirements for de jure recogni-
tion"' since 1949. Nonetheless the ROC claimed not only de jure title
to Taiwan but de jure title to mainland China. Even after success of
the communist revolution, the Nationalist government on Taiwan
unwaiveringly claimed to be the de jure government of mainland
China. They had in reality failed to fulfill the requirement of terri-
torial control, since Chiang Kai-chek was in de facto control of only
Taiwan and the Pescadores. Furthermore the PRC, not the ROC,
was undebatably in firm de facto control of a substantial portion of
the disputed territory.14 The Nationalists lacked any juridical basis
for assertion of de jure control over Taiwan or mainland China.
Although the ROC had obviously lost all hope of control over
the mainland, the United States joined in the brutally illogical per-
sistence that the Nationalists still de jure governed mainland China.
As previously noted the United States withheld recognition from
Communist China in a fruitless attempt to champion democracy.'
This stubborn adherence to Wilson's recognition politics'" was
substantially responsible for the prolonged confusion over Taiwan's
international legal status. If the United States had adopted the
declaratory view of recognition, it would have recognized the PRC
as the de jure government of mainland China when the success of
the communist revolution and the subsequent acquiesence of the
Chinese people were obvious. Recognition of the Kuomintang [KMT]
140. See Chiu, Normalization and Some Practical and Legal Problems Con-
cerning Taiwan, 2 OCCASIONAL PAPERS: REPRINT SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN
STUDIES 51 (H. CHIU, ed. 1978) (available from School of Law, University of Maryland).
141. By way of review, the minimum requirements for recognition are a de-
fined territory and population, a regime which is in control of the territory, and a
capacity to engage in foreign relations. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
142. See id. For the British view see WHITEMAN, Supra note 1, at 641.
143. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
144. See notes 54-59 supra and accompanying text.
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as the de jure government of mainland China as well as Taiwan and
the Pescadores succeeded only in providing a sense of legitimatiza-
tion sufficient to encourage ROC's impractical aspirations.
Contravention of the Right to Self-Determination
With the continuing support of de jure recognition the KMT
persisted in their claim to the Chinese "throne." Ludicrous persis-
tence in de jure title to mainland China has provided a sense of
legitimacy for repression of the Taiwanese right to self-determina-
tion. The Nationalist Kuomintang government retreated from the
mainland in 1949, treating the Taiwanese as a conquered people and
imposing martial law.'45 The KMT suspended operation of the ROC
constitution on the pretense of emergency measures in view of the
continuing state of war with Communist China. 46 All constitutional
guarantees of civil liberty have been abrogated since the state of
seige proclaimed in 1949.'7 Under the declared "Temporary Provi-
sions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion"'48 the
KMT has suspended indefinitely the constitutional rights to per-
sonal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of residence, freedom of
privacy, freedom of religious beliefs, freedom of assembly and asso-
ciation, and freedom of petition." ' The "Temporary Provisions" also
confer the right of authorities to control the press, censor mail, pro-
hibit strikes, conduct warrantless searches, register property, and
prohibit meetings.'T M Any views expressed contrary to the authori-
ties' claim to represent all China or supporting independence for
Taiwan are considered seditious and punishable under martial law."'
Additionally, there have been no general elections for the two ruling
bodies, the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, since
1948.15 The KMT further proclaims that general elections cannot be
held until they regain control over the mainland.IM The Taiwanese
145. See Taiwan (Republic of China), 6 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING
PAPER (October 1976), reprinted in TAIWAN: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS: ON S. 245, A BILL TO PROMOTE THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF COMMERCIAL, CULTURAL, AND OTHER RELATIONS
WITH THE PEOPLE ON TAIWAN ON AN UNOFFICIAL BASIS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 554 (1979) [Hereinafter cited as TAIWAN HEARINGS].
146. TAIWAN HEARINGS, supra note 145, at 557 (statement of Wilbur Chen).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 552, 560.
152. Id at 557.
153. Id.
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are therefore suspended in a state of continuing oppression by an ef-
fectively defunct regime.
The major impediment to self-determination of the peoples on
Taiwan stems from the ludicrous persistence on the part of the
KMT that it is the sole government of all of China-including the
mainland. The stalemated civil conflict between the Communists on
the mainland and the KMT on Taiwan has in reality produced two
independent states. The seemingly logical solution would be to for-
mally recognize the ROC as an independent entity. This is impossi-
ble, however, since the ROC, as well as the PRC, refuse such a solu-
tion. 5' As long as the KMT found international support for their
assertion of legal government over mainland China and the island of
Taiwan, the native Taiwanese were forced to accept Nationalist
rule.
Early United States policy certainly did not help to resolve the
situation. Since the United States utilized the constitutive doctrine
of recognition, it felt free to withhold de jure recognition from a
communist government with revolutionary origins.' 1 Accordingly
the United States obstinately held that the ROC was the de jure
government of mainland China although admittedly only the de facto
government of Taiwan and the Pescadores. During that period the
United States reluctantly acknowledged that the PRC was the de
facto government of mainland China but not the de jure govern-
ment.'" Taiwan's confused status has persisted for over three full
decades.
Change in Recognition Philosophy
Renunciation of the unwieldy and unrealistic China policy
began with the promulgation of the United States-PRC Commu-
nique '5 in 1972. In the so called "Shanghai Communique," President
Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai reviewed the longstanding dispute
over the status of Taiwan. Recognizing that the Taiwan question
was a "crucial obstruction""' for normalization of relations between
the PRC and the United States, President Nixon equivocally "ac-
154. Id
155. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
156. V. LI, DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS 9-10 (1977).
157. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA JULY
15, 1971-JANUARY 15, 1979 8 (Selected Documents No. 9, 1979). The Shanghai Com-
munique states in part: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of
China. The United States Government does not challenge that position." Id
158. Id
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knowledge[d] that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of
China." '159 Nevertheless the Shanghai Communique was a monumen-
tal step toward recognizing international reality.
United States acceptance of international reality culminated in
President Carter's extension of de jure recognition to the PRC as
the sole legal government of China.'" De jure recognition has finally
brought American practice into line with international consensus. In
recognizing the reality of the PRC's existence, the United States
has, at least temporarily, abandoned the non-legal consideration of
competing ideologies as a basis for denial of de jure recognition. The
United States is essentially subscribing to the mature and realistic
declaratory view.
Both the Shanghai Communique and the formal recognition of
the PRC, however, fall crucially short of the desired goal. The prin-
cipal fallacy is the assumption that all Chinese, including the native
Taiwanese, are seeking control over all of China. Only the PRC and the
Nationalists on Taiwan maintain that "there is only one China
and Taiwan is part of China."'' The Taiwanese people have not
considered themselves Chinese since their move from the mainland
to the island of Taiwan more than three centuries ago."' The
17,000,000 Taiwanese, who comprise 86% of the Taiwan popula-
tion,' " would have welcomed the opportunity to assert their inde-
pendence and right to self-determination. 6' The ill-conceived Shang-
hai Communique and the joint communique on recognition of the
PRC explicitly acknowledge either the stagnant KMT or the distant
communists' right to govern the wholly separate island population.
Even given this deficiency, Nationalist stalwarts in both
Taiwan and the United States inevitably and vehemently object to
any change in recognition philosophy.' Objection to de jure recogni-
159. Id at 7.
160. Id at 48. In announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China, President Carter explained: "We do not undertake this im-
portant step for transient tactical or expedient reasons. In recognizing the People's
Republic of China, we are recognizing simple reality." Id at 46.
161. Id at 8.
162. TAIWAN HEARINGS, supra note 145, at 437-38 (statement of Ralph N.
Clough).
163. TAIWAN HEARINGS, supra note 145, at 557 (statement of Wilbur Chen).
164. Id at 549, 573-74.
165. Another problem raised by President Carter's de jure recognition of the
PRC centered on the power of the President to cancel the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954 with the ROC. The termination had been a prerequisite to recognition of the
PRC. Senator Barry Goldwater brought a class action suit against President Carter
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tion of the PRC stems from the mistaken assumption that demo-
cratic rule on Taiwan is in jeopardy. De jure recognition in fact
renders democratic rule on Taiwan a possibility. It is the Taiwanese
people and not the repressive KMT who wish to establish an inde-
pendent and democratic Taiwan." With the withdrawal of the inter-
national legal support of de jure recognition, the prolonged state of
martial law has been stripped of its thin facade of legitimacy. United
States recognition of the PRC and attendant withdrawal" 7 of recog-
nition from the ROC has, perhaps inadvertently, complied with the
challenging the validity of treaty termination without consent of the Senate. After
determining that Congress as a whole did not evidence an intent to formally act on the
question, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the
action for lack of standing. Goldwater v. Carter, 47 U.S.L.W. 2816 (1979). Reversing
the district court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
deprivation of an opportunity to cast a vote on treaty termination was sufficient to
constitute standing. Goldwater v. Carter, 48 U.S.L.W. 2388 (1979). Without defining
the parameters of presidential power to unilaterally terminate treaties, the court of
appeals went on to hold that the power to terminate the specific treaty in issue rested
on the President's full and undisputed authority to recognize the People's Republic of
China. Id, at 2389. After granting certiorari but without briefing or oral argument, the
United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, and re-
manded to the district court with directions to dismiss the complaint. Goldwater v.
Carter, 48 U.S.L.W. 3402 (1979). However, the only judicial consensus was on the deci-
sion to dismiss. The major substantive dispute centered on the characterization of the
issue as a political question. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart,
and Stevens concluded that the presidential action involved affairs totally external to
the United States and therefore comprised a political question. Id. at 3403. Justice
Powell rejected the applicability of the political question doctrine, defining the issue as
one concerning the constitutional division of power between the executive and legisla-
tive branches. Id. at 3402. Justice Brennan also rejected the political question charac-
terization and based dismissal on a determination of the President's sole power to ter-
minate the treaty as dependent on the Executive's power to recognize the PRC and to
derecognize the ROC. Id at 3404. For a discussion of the legal issues the Court chose
to shun, see TAIWAN HEARINGS, supra note 145, at 189-233 (Memorandum for the Secre-
tary of State on the President's Power to Give Notice of Termination of US-ROC
Mutual Defense Treaty). Compare Kennedy, Normal Relations with China Good Law,
Good Policy, 65 A.B.A.J. 194 (1979), with Goldwater, Treaty Termination is a Shared
Power, 65 A.B.A.J. 198 (1979).
166. TAIWAN HEARINGS, supra note 145, at 549 (statement of Wilbur Chen).
167. The China question deals extensively not only with the recognition of the
PRC but with the withdrawal of recognition from the ROC. This is a novel problem in
international law. Ordinarily the non-recognition of a state is the closest situation to
the withdrawal of recognition that has ever occurred in international relations. Non-
recognition by the United States has always had the connotations that the regime was
an unfriendly government or that the status of the state was questionable. This is not
the problem presented in the current issue. Taiwan is a friendly state. Therefore, some
scholars conclude that de jure recognition cannot be withdrawn under the circum-
stances. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 349-57; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at
§ 96. Even those that proclaim recognition as a purely political matter agree that once
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mature and realistic declaratory view of recognition by recognizing
the reality of the PRC's statehood under international law.'68 In
undermining the legitimacy of the Kuomintang, recognition of the
PRC has additionally, albeit inadvertently, resulted in the promotion
of the fundamental international legal right to self-determination for
the people on Taiwan.
CONCLUSION
In persistent adherence to the constitutive theory of recogni-
tion, the United States had been in contravention of fundamental
principles of international law. During the protracted period of non-
recognition of the PRC, the United States provided a sense of legiti-
macy to the repressive Kuomintang. Formal recognition of the
Nationalist government on Taiwan only succeeded in butressing that
government's claim of legal title to mainland China. In maintenance
of that claim, the Kuomintang insisted on suppressing the self-deter-
mination of the Taiwanese through denial of their right to general
elections. Additionally United States refusal to recognize the PRC
centered solely on the existence of a government with an opposing
ideology regardless of popular support. American recognition policy
thereby impeded the overriding right to self-determination for both
the communist mainlanders and the Taiwanese.
With the change in recognition policy, the United States has in
effect subscribed to the mature and realistic declaratory view. More
importantly, however, the withdrawal of recognition has left the
Kuomintang virtually without any major international support for
their insistence on legal title to the mainland. In such a position, it
is doubtful that the Nationalists can maintain the suspension of the
ROC constitution for any prolonged period. The Taiwanese are now
in a better position than ever before to assert their right to self-
determination through elections. Perhaps those elections will ulti-
recognition is extended, the rule of pacta sunt servanda prohibits its withdrawal.
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 349. The rationale for this policy is the interest in main-
taining stability in international relations. Id. Therefore it is generally proposed that
recognition can only be withdrawn if the state recognized no longer fulfills the mini-
mum requirements for recognition. Withdrawal of governmental recognition is also
usually implied from the recognition of a revolutionary regime. Id at 352. But since
the status of the ROC has undergone a material change in that the Kuomintang
government is no longer in control of the mainland, the prohibition against withdrawal
of recognition is not applicable. International law allows a state to deal with the de
jure government and the de facto government of a state if they are separate entities.
Id. at 11.
168. See notes 27-38 supra and accompanying text.
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mately result in independence-an independence from not only the
PRC but from their own oppressive government as well.
Pamela P. Price
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